Research Papers

RELAP5/MOD3.3 Analyses for Prevention Strategy of Extended Station Blackout

[+] Author and Article Information
Andrej Prošek

Jožef Stefan Institute,
Jamova Cesta 39, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: andrej.prosek@ijs.si

Andrija Volkanovski

Jožef Stefan Institute,
Jamova Cesta 39, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: andrija.volkanovski@ijs.si

1Corresponding author.

Manuscript received March 16, 2015; final manuscript received June 9, 2015; published online September 3, 2015. Assoc. Editor: Leon Cizelj.

ASME J of Nuclear Rad Sci 1(4), 041016 (Sep 03, 2015) (10 pages) Paper No: NERS-15-1028; doi: 10.1115/1.4030834 History: Received March 16, 2015; Accepted June 12, 2015; Online September 16, 2015

The purpose of the study was to investigate the application of deterministic safety analysis for a prevention strategy of the extended station blackout (SBO). A method for the assessment of portable pump flow rates for a steam generator (SG) makeup is proposed. The RELAP5/MOD3.3 computer code and input model of a two-loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) is used for analyses, assuming different injection start times, flow rates, and reactor coolant system (RCS) losses. The calculated results show the effectiveness of the proposed extended SBO prevention strategy. The results demonstrate the need for mitigation of the common cause failure (CCF) potential of the on-site and off-site power sources.

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Fig. 1

RELAP5 hydraulics components view of two-loop PWR

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Fig. 2

Main plant parameters to support the FLEX strategy: NO_LOCA, S_LOCA, and SLD_LOCA base cases

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Fig. 3

Main parameters for preparing prevention strategy without plant instrumentation: NO_LOCA, S_LOCA, and SLD_LOCA base cases

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Fig. 4

Assessment of the flow rates of the portable pump for the SLD_LOCA_t05f0 case

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Fig. 5

Comparison of the SLD_LOCA_f0 cases with different injection delay times

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Fig. 6

Comparison of the SL_LOCA_f0 cases with different injection delay times

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Fig. 7

Comparison of the S_LOCA_f0 cases with different injection delay times

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Fig. 8

Comparison of the NO_LOCA_f0 cases with different injection delay times

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Fig. 9

LOOP probability of exceedance versus duration curve

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Fig. 10

Probability of exceedance versus duration curve



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